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Prosecuting Domestic Violence After Giles: 
Why a Categorical Approach to the 
Forfeiture Doctrine Threatens Female Autonomy 
MICHAEL VARGAS 
INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors face a unique dilemma in domestic violence cases after Crawford 
v. Washington.1  Post-Crawford, the Confrontation Clause requires any statement 
deemed “testimonial” to be subject to cross-examination in order to be admitted 
against the defendant, no matter how reliable or fundamental the evidence is to 
the prosecutor’s case.2  Application of the Confrontation Clause is especially 
salient in domestic violence cases because successful prosecution of alleged 
abusers often hinges on the admission of “testimonial” out-of-court statements 
and sworn affidavits made by a victim of abuse against her spouse.3  
Introduction of these accusations of domestic violence into evidence is further 
complicated by the fact that a victim of domestic abuse is often reluctant to 
cooperate with prosecutors by testifying against her spouse, therefore denying 
the defendant any meaningful opportunity for cross-examination.4  As a result, 
the Confrontation Clause often precludes admittance of these probative victim 
statements.  If prosecutors wish to somehow introduce this evidence at trial, they 
must seek an alternative means of doing so. 
Absent an opportunity for cross-examination, “testimonial” evidence can 
only be admitted against the defendant in one of two ways: (1) if the statement in 
question was a dying declaration made by the victim when her death was 
imminent; or (2) if the defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation by his 
own wrongdoing.5  Dying declarations do not play a significant role in domestic 
 
  J.D., Duke University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Lisa Kern Griffin for her 
help and support in writing this Note. 
  1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands 
what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”); 
contra Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
 3. See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 281–82 
(2006) (noting that prior to Crawford, prosecutors did not depend heavily on live testimony because 
the excited utterance hearsay exception allowed admission of the statements of accusers to law 
enforcement taken at the scene of the crime; these statements, if not taken to try to defuse an 
emergency, would likely qualify as testimonial under Davis). 
 4. Rebecca McKinstry, “An Exercise in Fiction”: The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, and Domestic Violence in Davis v. Washington, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 531, 
531 (2007). Although I recognize that domestic violence can be initiated by either the male or female 
spouse, for the sake of clarity in reading and writing this Note, I will use male pronouns to refer to 
the abusive spouse and female pronouns to refer to the victim spouse. 
 5. Tim Donaldson & Karen Olson, “Classic Abusive Relationships” and the Inference of Witness 
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violence prosecutions even if the victim dies because the statements sought to be 
introduced are usually provided to law enforcement when the victim’s death is 
not imminent.6  The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, therefore, has become 
the primary tool for prosecutors attempting to introduce “testimonial” evidence 
at trial when a domestic violence victim refuses to testify against her spouse. 
Not surprisingly, domestic violence prosecutors have argued for a broad 
application of the forfeiture doctrine that extends even to cases in which the 
victim is still alive and has voluntarily decided not to testify against her spouse.7  
Their rationale for doing so is as follows: a broad application of the forfeiture 
doctrine is necessary, even if the victim voluntarily decides not to testify against 
her spouse about prior accusations of abuse, because victims of domestic 
violence are being pressured or coerced by the defendant into not testifying for 
fear of violent reprisal.8 
It may be surprising, though, that this prosecutorial tactic could be backed 
by Supreme Court precedent.  In Giles v. California,9 the Supreme Court clarified 
that the defendant must have specifically intended to prevent a witness from 
testifying in order to forfeit his right of confrontation.10  However, the Court also 
addressed in dictum the possible application of the forfeiture doctrine in cases of 
domestic violence where the crime results in the victim’s death.11  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, noted that evidence of prior domestic abuse could be 
relevant to the intent inquiry of the forfeiture doctrine because acts of domestic 
violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from obtaining any outside 
assistance.12  But Justice Souter, in his concurrence, went one step further.  Souter 
noted that an abusive relationship is per se sufficient to presume the defendant’s 
specific intent to prevent the victim from testifying because an abusive 
relationship is meant to isolate the victim from any cooperation with law 
enforcement.13 
This Note argues that in domestic violence cases where the victim is still 
alive, the forfeiture doctrine should be concerned solely with the specific intent 
of the defendant, as emphasized by the Supreme Court majority in Giles, in lieu 
of any categorical alternative.  Scalia’s case-by-case approach is underinclusive; 
 
Tampering in Family Violence Cases After Giles v. California, 36 LINCOLN L. REV. 45, 45–46 (2009) (citing 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). 
 6. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 7. See Adam M. Krischer, “Though Justice May Be Blind, It is Not Stupid”: Applying Common Sense 
to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence Cases, 1 THE VOICE 1, 6 (Nov. 2004), available 
at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/the-voice-vol-1-issue-1.pdf (“Prosecutors must educate their 
judges that the domestic violence itself may have procured the victim’s unavailability.”). 
 8. See id. at 3 (“As most . . . domestic violence prosecutors have known for decades, a domestic 
violence abuser does not necessarily stop the abuse when the criminal justice system intervenes. 
Instead, many abusers become more abusive to reassert control over the victim.”). 
 9. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 10. See id. at 367. 
 11. Id. at 376–77. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (noting “the absence from the early material of any 
reason to doubt that the element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on 
the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim 
from outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process”). 
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in some cases, the inference of the defendant’s specific intent to prevent a victim 
from testifying, as ascertained by direct or circumstantial evidence, might be so 
strong as to require a (rebuttable) presumption of forfeiture.  But Souter’s 
categorical approach, while a valuable prospective tool for prosecutors, is 
overinclusive; in trying to enhance the voice of domestic violence victims, the 
law actually silences victims who do not wish to testify against their spouses by 
speaking for them. 
Instead, specific intent should remain a primary guiding marker in the 
forfeiture inquiry for domestic violence crimes as it is in criminal law generally.  
Courts should focus on the specific intent of the defendant through the analysis 
of direct or circumstantial evidence because it is only in those cases where such 
evidence exists that the victim is actually being coerced into not testifying.  That 
is, only in cases where there is such evidence has the defendant clearly 
manifested his intent to deprive the domestic violence victim of an opportunity 
to obtain outside assistance.  Therefore, only those cases merit an override of the 
victim’s autonomy and voice as to her decision to offer any testimonial evidence. 
By not focusing on the specific intent of the defendant, the state will inevitably 
silence the voices of those that are already voiceless in the criminal justice 
system: victims of domestic abuse.14  Instead of being able to shape their own 
destinies, victims of domestic violence have to rely on the state’s blanket 
assertion that, in order for women to attain an even footing with their male 
counterparts, introducing prior accusations against their explicit wishes is both 
in their own best interest and in the best interest of society generally. 
In Part I of this Note, I present an overview of the current state of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, including a discussion of the forfeiture 
doctrine.  In Part II of this Note, I explain the reasons why prosecutors believe 
that a categorical approach to forfeiture is a necessary tool for successful 
domestic violence prosecution.  In Part III, I argue that such a broad approach to 
the forfeiture doctrine relies upon a flawed premise that a victim of domestic 
violence would always want to testify against her spouse unless she was being 
coerced not to testify.  I note that there are both policy and practical reasons 
suggesting that such an approach would not automatically vindicate women’s 
rights but could actually significantly impair them.  In Part IV of this Note, I 
compare the forfeiture doctrine in domestic violence cases to the diffusion of the 
adverse testimony privilege from an outright prohibition to the current 
autonomy-based approach.  I will argue that such an approach reasonably 
applies to the forfeiture doctrine as well, given that both doctrines involve the 
 
 14. Several articles have already been written as to whether a broad forfeiture right could 
disintegrate the categorical protection of the Confrontation Clause. This Note, for the most part, will 
not focus on this issue beyond the general fact that a broad application threatens the emanating 
principles and protections behind the Crawford decision in the context of domestic violence. This Note 
will focus instead on the effect that a broad application has on female autonomy and that this is 
enough to sway the application of the clause to a focus on specific intent rather than an approach 
based on a certain category of crimes (in this case, domestic violence). For further information 
relating to a concern about the disintegration of Crawford through a broad application of the forfeiture 
doctrine, see Rebecca Sims Talbott, What Remains of the “Forfeited” Right to Confrontation? Restoring 
Sixth Amendment Values to the Forfeiture-By-Wrongdoing Rule in Light of Crawford v. Washington and 
Giles v. California, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1291 (2010); and James F. Flanagan, In Defense of Giles—A 
Response to Professor Lininger, 87 TEX. L. REV. 67, 76–77 (2009). 
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exclusion of potentially probative evidence.  Finally, in Part V of this article, I 
operationalize my theory and argue that a focus on the specific intent of the 
defendant is the preferable approach, should the Court wish to vindicate the 
victim’s autonomy and voice while preventing further gender inequality. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE 
A. The Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”15  The Confrontation 
Clause protects the defendant from potential federal abuse in several key ways.  
For one, the Confrontation Clause codifies the Framers’ foundational belief in the 
importance of cross-examination.16  This belief is thought to have emanated from 
the common law response to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was found 
guilty of treason after various hearsay statements were introduced against him.17  
Throughout the proceeding, Raleigh pleaded with the presiding judges to allow 
him to confront Lord Cobham, an accusatory witness, in order to expose 
Cobham’s accusations as a lie.18 
The Confrontation Clause can therefore be interpreted as a response to the 
shortcomings of Raleigh’s trial in several ways.19  First, the Confrontation Clause 
ensures the reliability of evidence at trial by allowing the defendant to extract the 
truth of the matter through cross-examination.20  Second, the right of 
confrontation ensures the appearance of procedural fairness and respect for the 
accused by providing a mechanism through which the defendant can physically 
face his accuser.21  Third, the Confrontation Clause prevents government abuse 
by preventing trials by affidavit and potential witness misinterpretation by the 
jury.22  However, some ambiguity remained as to the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause in determining what specific type of evidence was subject to cross-
examination.  This question was initially answered in Ohio v. Roberts.23  
  In Roberts, the Supreme Court clarified that in order to introduce non-
confronted hearsay evidence, the prosecution must satisfy a two-pronged test. 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 16.  Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of Its Common Law Background, 26 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1991). 
 17. Id.; see also David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1646–47 (2009). 
 18. Sklansky, supra note 17, at 1647.  Raleigh, in his trial, famously pleaded, “[Let] my accuser 
come face to face, and be deposed. Were the case but for a small copyhold, you would have witnesses 
or good proof to lead the jury to a verdict; and I am here for my life!” William O. Douglas, A 
Challenge to the Bar, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 497, 499 (1953).  
 19. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (“The basic purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause was to ‘targe[t]’ the sort of ‘abuses’ exemplified at the notorious treason trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh.”). 
 20. See Talbott, supra note 14, at 1296 (noting that the reliability of evidence is “widely 
considered the most ‘central concern’ of the Clause”). 
 21. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990). 
 22. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). 
 23. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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First, the prosecution must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose 
statement the prosecution seeks to introduce.24  Then, the prosecution must 
prove that the statement itself bears adequate “indicia of reliability” to 
“comport[] with the ‘substance of constitutional protection.’”25  If both prongs 
are met, then the hearsay evidence can be admitted at trial without being subject 
to the defendant’s confrontation. However, this rationale was subsequently 
reversed in Crawford v. Washington,26  which now delineates the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Under Crawford, only non-testimonial hearsay evidence can be admitted at 
trial without being subject to confrontation.27  Crawford supplanted the previous 
“reliability of the evidence” inquiry central to the Roberts decision by focusing 
instead on the history of the Confrontation Clause.  Examination of the clause’s 
legislative history provided two key inferences: (1) the Framers were primarily 
concerned with the evils associated with the introduction of ex parte 
examinations and other forms of testimonial evidence; and (2) the Framers 
would never have allowed admission of such testimonial evidence unless the 
declarant was unavailable at trial and there was a suitable prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.28  The Court added that Roberts’ reliability concern placed too 
much focus on the interpretation of an “amorphous concept,” thereby allocating 
too much discretion in the hands of judges.29  Instead, the only way to safeguard 
the accused from government abuse is for the accused to have a broad 
categorical protection in his right to confrontation in lieu of a malleable balancing 
test.  Questions remained, however, as to how to apply Crawford’s new criterion 
for the admission of non-confronted hearsay because the definition of 
“testimonial” was “le[ft] for another day.”30 
Two years later, the Supreme Court shed some light on the definition of 
“testimonial” in Davis v. Washington.31  Davis clarified that statements made to 
government officials when not attempting to defuse an emergency situation are 
tantamount to statements taken to mount a law enforcement investigation.32 
These statements are therefore “testimonial” and must be subject to cross-
examination by the defendant if the statements are to be introduced at trial.33  In 
 
 24. Id. at 65. 
 25. Id. at 66. 
 26. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 27. See id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as 
does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny altogether.”). 
 28. Id. at 50–55. 
 29. Id. at 61. 
 30. Id. at 68. 
 31. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 32. Id. at 822. 
 33. See generally id. at 828. The Davis case was consolidated with Hammon v. Indiana, another 
domestic violence case in which introduction of probative statements depended on whether it was 
deemed “testimonial” or not. The Davis case concerned a 911 call in which the victim of a domestic 
disturbance relayed to the 911 operator that the defendant was in the process of hitting her with his 
fists. The court determined that this statement was not testimonial because the purpose of the 
statement made to the 911 operator was to defuse an ongoing emergency. This determination was 
Vargas Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2012 10:12 AM 
178 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 20:173 2012 
determining whether statements elicited from the witness by law enforcement 
qualify as “testimonial” under this logic, lower courts are to apply a “primary 
purpose test.”34  That is, lower courts must determine whether the primary 
purpose in obtaining the statement is to either defuse an emergency situation or 
to mount a law enforcement investigation.35  But even though the Supreme Court 
provided the lower courts with some guidance as to how to determine whether 
evidence qualifies as “testimonial,” it still remained unclear how expansive the 
scope of an emergency might be and whose primary purpose is determinative in 
assessing whether the given statement is “testimonial,” that of the declarant or 
that of the law enforcement official. 
Recently, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Supreme Court elaborated on the scope 
of what qualifies as an emergency response, noting that the scope can be quite 
broad.36  Bryant involved statements made by a victim who was shot and later 
discovered by law enforcement in a gas station parking lot.37 After police 
questioning at the gas station, the victim identified the shooter and told police 
that he recognized the shooter’s voice before being shot.38  The Court clarified 
that these statements, identifying the shooter, qualified as “nontestimonial” 
because (1) the police officers were attempting to defuse an ongoing emergency, 
given that the defendant carried a gun and presented a threat to the public at 
large; and (2) the victim had no viable reason to fabricate the statements.39 When 
someone is severely injured at the scene of a crime, the Court noted, there can be 
little doubt that the statements being made are reliable because the witness 
would have little reason to fabricate any evidence.40 
In Bryant, the Supreme Court again emphasized the reliability of the 
statements in question in determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies 
in lieu of the broad categorical safeguard of Crawford.  Use of such broad 
reliability language in Bryant likely means that fewer statements will be deemed 
testimonial in the future, thereby relegating the utility of the forfeiture doctrine 
to a secondary tool for prosecutors seeking to admit probative evidence.41  What 
 
contrasted with the Hammon case, in which the victim’s statement was taken by an officer at the scene 
of the crime after both the victim and the accused were already separated, and after the accused no 
longer posed any further threat to the victim. The court reasoned that this statement was testimonial 
because the police officer at the scene took the statements with the primary purpose of assembling 
“replies for use in his ‘investigat[ion].’” Id. at 830.  
 34. Id. at 822. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 37. Id. at 1150. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1166–67. 
 40. See id. at 1157 (“Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in 
statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably significantly 
diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of 
cross-examination.”). 
 41. This is because the scope of an emergency seems to be much more expansive than previously 
believed, given that the shooter was no longer present and given that the harm had already occurred 
in the past. Rather, the officers explicitly noted that their purpose in being at the gas station and in 
asking the victim questions was simply to apprehend the suspect. Id. at 1151. So, it is quite possible 
that statements that would otherwise be deemed “testimonial” under Crawford and Davis are now 
likely to be deemed “nontestimonial” after Bryant. These nontestimonial statements under Bryant 
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is clear is that the scope of the Confrontation Clause is still in flux and that the 
forfeiture doctrine presents a salient, albeit perhaps secondary, solution to the 
introduction of testimonial evidence under Crawford. 
B. The Forfeiture Doctrine 
Most important for the purpose of this Note is the Court’s discussion in 
Giles v. California as to when a defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation, 
even if the evidence sought to be admitted against him undoubtedly qualifies as 
“testimonial.”42  In 2002, Dwayne Giles killed Brenda Avie, shooting her six 
times.43  Giles alleged that the shooting was in self-defense.44  Three weeks before 
this incident, Avie provided several statements to law enforcement about an 
alleged domestic altercation.45  Specifically, Avie alleged that Giles, her boyfriend 
at the time, had repeatedly punched her in the hand and face, choked her, and 
threatened to stab her with a knife.46  At trial, the California prosecutor 
attempted to introduce these statements to rebut Giles’ affirmative defense,47 
even though, under Crawford, these statements were plainly testimonial.48 
According to California law at the time, statements describing the infliction 
or threat of physical violence were admissible in open court when the declarant 
is both unavailable and when the prior statements are deemed particularly 
trustworthy.49  The underlying rationale for the admission of these statements is 
that the doctrine of forfeiture applies as an equitable principle to ensure that a 
defendant does not benefit from his own wrongdoing by procuring witness 
unavailability through the threat of violence.50  In other words, the law 
establishes that the defendant should be precluded from raising a Confrontation 
Clause-based defense since he seemingly procured the witness’s absence 
himself.51  Both the California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme 
Court found this to be a proper application of the doctrine of forfeiture and 
concluded that the statements were admissible against Giles in court because: (1) 
Giles caused Avie’s unavailability by murdering her; and (2) there was no reason 
to suspect Avie’s statements to law enforcement three weeks prior to the crime’s 
 
might very well include prior accusations of domestic violence since the defendant is still at large and 
likely still living with his spouse. 
 42. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 43. Id. at 356. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 356–57. 
 47. Id. at 356. 
 48. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (“Statements taken by police officers in 
the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.”).  
 49. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1370 (West Supp. 2008). Note that this law is very similar to the Supreme 
Court’s formulation in Ohio v. Roberts, overturned in Crawford v. Washington. 
 50. Giles, 554 U.S. at 357. 
 51. See, e.g., GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 141 (1756), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=6MwDAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false(noting a defendant “shall never be admitted to shelter himself 
by such evil Practices on the Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong”). 
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commission were not trustworthy.52 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, noting that in order for the 
defendant to forfeit his right of confrontation, the defendant must have 
wrongfully procured the unavailability of the witness with the specific intent to 
prevent the victim from testifying.53  Unlike the California statute in question, the 
defendant’s knowledge that performing a certain intimidating act could prevent a 
witness from testifying does not suffice for the admission of hearsay evidence.54  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, clarified that while the doctrine of 
forfeiture may be equitable in nature, it was primarily intended to target 
defendants who attempt to “bribe, intimidate, or kill any witnesses against him 
. . . .”55  It was therefore not aimed at ensuring that any defendant who 
wrongfully caused the absence of a victim from the witness stand be deprived of 
an opportunity for cross examination without any inquiry into his mens rea.  A 
contrary reading would be dangerous for two reasons.  First, this approach 
would require a prior judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of the 
act in question for which the defendant is at trial before the issue ever reaches the 
jury.56  Second, a judicial determination of what is “fair” amounts to “a thinly 
veiled invitation to overrule Crawford” by returning to the reliability concern in 
Roberts.57 This is because Crawford specifically mandated a broad categorical 
guarantee in lieu of a judicial determination on the application of the amorphous 
concept of “reliability.”58 
The Court also addressed, in dictum, the role that the forfeiture doctrine 
might specifically play in domestic violence cases.  The majority opinion plainly 
asserts that the forfeiture doctrine always requires an inquiry into the specific 
intent of the defendant, even if such an inquiry would be detrimental to the 
conviction of potential domestic abusers.59  There cannot be a unique 
Confrontation Clause approach to domestic violence crimes, according to the 
majority, which renders the defendant’s mens rea irrelevant due to concerns 
about fundamental fairness.60  That is not to say, however, that the domestic 
violence context plays no role in determining whether the defendant has 
forfeited his right to confrontation: “Acts of domestic violence often are intended 
to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct 
designed to prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal 
prosecutions.”61  So, if the victim dies, previous evidence of abuse or threats of 
 
 52. Giles, 554 U.S. at 357. 
 53. Id. at 367–68. 
 54. See id. at 367 (“‘Forfeiture by wrongdoing,’ . . . applies only when the defendant ‘engaged or 
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant 
as a witness.’”) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 374. 
 56. See id. at 365 (noting that such a rationale “does not sit well with the right to trial by jury”). 
 57. Id. at 374. 
 58. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 59. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. 
 60. Id. (“Is the suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers 
adopted and Crawford described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause 
for those crimes that are frequently directed against women?”). 
 61. Id. at 377. 
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abuse could be highly relevant in determining the defendant’s mens rea at the 
time of the crime.62 
In his concurrence, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with 
the majority’s formulation of the forfeiture doctrine but argued that the majority 
adopted the wrong approach as to the role that evidence of past abuse or threats 
of abuse plays in the forfeiture inquiry.63  Like the majority, Souter argued that 
the intent requirement for the forfeiture doctrine can be satisfied by an inference 
that the accuser sought to prevent the victim from testifying and that he intended 
to “thwart the judicial process” in doing so.64  Souter differentiated himself from 
Scalia, however, by stating that in the “classic abusive relationship,” the element 
of intent would be satisfied more often than not because abusive relationships, 
by their very nature, are “meant to isolate the victim from outside help.”65  If this 
fundamental premise is correct, Souter argued, there is no reason to think that, 
prior to the commission of the act in question, the abusive defendant 
“abandoned the dynamics of [the abusive relationship].”66  That is, unlike Scalia’s 
formulation in which evidence of an abusive relationship is one of several factors 
that can be used to infer the defendant’s specific intent, an abusive relationship, 
according to Souter, constitutes per se forfeiture without any further inquiry 
needed into the defendant’s mens rea.67 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer also seemingly endorsed Souter’s 
view, “recogniz[ing] that ‘domestic violence’ cases are ‘notoriously susceptible to 
intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at 
trial.’”68 Therefore, it is acceptable to presume purpose “based on no more than 
evidence of a history of domestic violence.”69 
Albeit dictum, such persuasive reasoning has allowed prosecutors to argue 
for a broad application of the forfeiture doctrine in all domestic violence cases, 
even where the victim is still alive but refuses to cooperate.  Their reason for 
proffering such a broad application of the forfeiture doctrine is as follows. 
II. A BROAD FORFEITURE APPLICATION IN LIVING VICTIM CASES 
In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act70 (VAWA) put a national 
spotlight on the state’s general inability to protect victims of domestic violence.71 
Traditionally, the state restricted the crime of domestic violence to the private 
sphere, insisting that domestic interference was outside of the state’s police 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. (“If the evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it 
would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the 
dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger.”). 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. at 406 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902. 
 71. G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of 
Accountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 157 (2008). 
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power.72  But by labeling domestic violence as a private act, the state 
relinquished any obligation to assist those subject to systematic abuse.  This 
systematic violence, some argue, has perpetuated gender inequities because the 
abuser attains a position of power over his abused.73  VAWA sought to remedy 
this abuse and gender inequality by providing increased federal funding for the 
investigation and prosecution of domestic violence crimes.  However, the 
resulting media attention relating to the passage of VAWA also seemingly placed 
considerable pressure on prosecutors to secure convictions of alleged domestic 
abusers.74 
Prosecutors responded to this national spotlight on domestic violence in 
several ways.  First, as a public policy measure, states accorded the same level of 
intervention to the crime of domestic violence as they would accord to any other 
crime under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.75  Second, in 
order to institute these measures, several states, including New York, adopted 
no-drop policies that force state prosecutors to press charges whenever an 
alleged instance of domestic violence is reported to the State Attorney’s Office by 
law enforcement, regardless of whether or not the victim wants to press 
charges.76  Third, if the victim refused to assist the government in the prosecution 
of her spouse by making herself unavailable,77 prosecutors would still attempt to 
proffer past accusations of domestic violence at trial by arguing that introduction 
of these statements was both necessary and reliable under the Roberts regime.78 
With the subsequent change in Supreme Court case law, many prosecutors 
came to believe that Crawford posed a large hurdle to domestic violence 
convictions.79  In cases of domestic violence, often the lone two witnesses, or at 
least the most important two witnesses, are the abusive spouse and the victim 
spouse.80  The abusive spouse is unlikely to testify because he can assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.81  This means the victim spouse often holds the key to the 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Treatment of VAWA’s Civil 
Rights Remedy, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327(2003). 
 74. See generally id. 
 75. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative 
Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 231 (2003); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 76. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1226 
(2001). 
 77. The victim in a domestic violence prosecution can make herself unavailable in various ways. 
For example, the victim can make herself unavailable by contempt of court, by privilege, or by failure 
to appear. See Brian J. Hurley, Confrontation and the Unavailable Witness: Searching for a Standard, 18 
VAL. U. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (1983); Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined 
Reach but not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2006), http://students.law. 
umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/griffin.pdf. 
 78. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 79. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750 (“In a survey 
of over 60 prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon, and Washington, 63 percent of respondents 
reported the Crawford decision has significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence.”). 
 80. See JOHN E. B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE CASES, 
VOLUME 1 849 (2005). 
 81. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”). 
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successful prosecution of the accused.  In Giles, Scalia correctly pointed out that 
statements concerning the abuse made to friends and neighbors, as well as to 
physicians in the course of treatment, would still be admissible post-Crawford 
should these statements satisfy state hearsay rules.82  But oftentimes the sole 
evidence in these cases, or at least the most probative evidence in these private 
altercations, will be in the form of statements or affidavits made to law 
enforcement by the victim concerning prior instances of abuse, which 
undoubtedly qualify as “testimonial” under Crawford.83  Therefore, there are only 
two ways to introduce such powerful probative evidence in the domestic 
violence context post-Crawford: (1) subject the evidence to cross-examination; or 
(2) argue that the defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation due to his 
own wrongdoing. 
The first option is not very promising.  Historically, spouses were 
disqualified from testifying against their spouses in court.84  While there is now 
only a privilege where there was once a general prohibition,85 an abused spouse 
is still generally reluctant to testify against the defendant spouse.  Various 
empirical studies suggest that victims of domestic violence are more likely to 
recant prior statements or to refuse to testify than are victims of any other 
crime.86  About eighty percent of accusers in domestic violence prosecutions 
refuse to cooperate with the government at some point in the case.87  Their 
reasons for this reluctance vary.  Testifying is an inherently stressful event and 
testifying against one’s spouse can be even more stressful.88  It certainly does not 
help the prosecution either that victims can easily avoid testifying by asserting 
the adverse testimony privilege, which allows the victim to choose to what 
degree, if any, she wishes to testify against her spouse.89  Even in states like New 
York where such a marital testimonial privilege does not exist, the victim spouse 
may elect to make herself unavailable by placing herself in contempt in lieu of 
testifying.  So, if the prosecution is to introduce these probative statements, the 
most likely means of doing so is by virtue of the forfeiture doctrine. 
There certainly are valid policy reasons to believe that a broad forfeiture 
application is necessary to secure the conviction of domestic abusers.  About one 
 
 82. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (noting that 
“[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms” are not excluded by the hearsay rule). 
 83. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004). 
 84. Myrna S. Raeder, Thoughts About Giles and Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1329, 1333 (2010). 
 85. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
 86. See Lininger, supra note 79, at 751, 768–69 (“Recent evidence suggests that 80 to 85 percent of 
battered women will recant at some point.”); see also Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be 
Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as 
Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002) (estimating that ninety percent of domestic 
violence victims recant). 
 87. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996); Lininger, supra note 79, at 751. 
 88. See Flanagan, supra note 14, at 76. 
 89. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (1980) (concluding that the witness-spouse may neither be 
compelled to, nor foreclosed from, testifying). 
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in five victims of domestic violence is repeatedly battered.90  It is additionally 
estimated that up to ninety percent of battered women never report this abuse.91  
Of those incidents that are reported to police, nearly half of the victims allege 
that their spouses threatened them with physical violence should they assist the 
prosecution.92  Should the victims decide to leave their partners during their 
spouses’ prosecution, studies suggest that this departure period is the most 
dangerous period for victims of abuse.93  During this period, married, female 
victims of domestic violence are four times more likely to report being raped, 
assaulted, or stalked.94  Further, it cannot be doubted that violence can be used as 
a method of control in abusive relationships to dissuade victims from obtaining 
outside help. Due to this likelihood of coercion in abusive relationships by means 
of violence, there is no doubt that forfeiture must play a key role in domestic 
violence prosecutions, even in living victim cases.  The difficulty lies in 
determining the scope of that role. 
Under Justice Souter’s formulation in Giles, forfeiture applies as long as the 
relationship in question qualifies as a “classic abusive relationship.”95  But it is 
unclear exactly what a “classic abusive relationship” is and how broad this 
designation might be.  As a result, Souter’s formulation could seemingly extend 
to all domestic violence prosecutions, including those in which the victim is alive 
but unavailable (whether through privilege, contempt, or physical 
unavailability).  If the trial court finds as a matter of fact that the defendant and 
the victim were involved in a “classic abusive relationship,” then it will be 
presumed that the defendant procured the unavailability of the victim.  Thus, a 
defendant could forfeit his right to confrontation in a domestic violence case 
simply because a living spouse has refused to testify against him.  It is further 
unclear whether this presumption would be rebuttable.96 
However, this formulation is questionable because it hinges on a flawed 
premise: that a victim of domestic abuse would always want to testify against 
her spouse absent the defendant’s coercion.  Such a fundamental premise is not 
accurate in its blanket application to all domestic violence cases for various 
reasons.  First, it is unclear as a matter of policy whether the forced introduction 
of past accusations of abuse really vindicates the autonomy of women.  It is quite 
possible that this policy does the exact opposite.97  Second, there are various 
practical reasons why a victim of abuse might not want to testify against her 
spouse absent any abuse or coercion, including economic and familial concerns.  
If there is no probative evidence to suggest that she is being coerced into not 
 
 90. Alana Dunnigan, Restoring Power to the Powerless: The Need to Reform California’s Mandatory 
Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1031, 1038-40 (2003). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Krischer, supra note 7, at 3. 
 93. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NAT’L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 37 (2000). 
 94. Id. In addition, male victims of domestic violence are three times as likely to report being 
raped, assaulted, or stalked during this period. Id. 
 95. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 380 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 96. Given that Justice Souter claimed that such a finding would constitute per se forfeiture 
instead of a strong presumption of forfeiture. 
 97. See infra Section III. 
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testifying, the victim’s decision should be respected. Rather, the focus should 
turn to any legislative alternatives that would allow the victim to safely flee from 
an abusive spouse of her own volition. 
If prosecution of domestic violence was meant to cure the systematic 
violence against women that perpetuates gender inequality, a categorical 
approach to forfeiture in these cases actually threatens gender equality in a 
reciprocal fashion.  A categorical approach allows the state to assert power over 
the “victimized” by silencing her wants and needs without any specific 
consideration as to whether her decision was actually coerced.  The many 
reasons why a broad application of forfeiture threatens female voice and 
autonomy are discussed below. 
III. WHY AN OVERBROAD APPROACH THREATENS FEMALE AUTONOMY  
Criminal law is a sanction for actions committed against the state, not for 
actions committed against a particular individual.  For that reason, the victim’s 
consent is not traditionally required for the prosecution of the defendant.  That is 
not to say, however, that the victim’s consent does not play a key role in the 
prosecutor’s determination as to whether the state will press charges or not.  
Without the victim’s consent, prosecution of the accused can be extremely 
challenging since the victim is often a key witness.98  So, if the victim does not 
want to press charges, oftentimes the prosecutor will abide by those wishes and 
drop the case given the difficulty that the victim’s lack of cooperation has on 
proving the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yet, under no-drop 
policies for domestic violence prosecutions, which many jurisdictions have 
adopted, a prosecutor cannot drop the case even if the victim does not wish to 
proceed.  Instead, prosecutors are forced to try the case and introduce whatever 
probative evidence can be admitted, even if the evidence is admitted without the 
victim’s consent. 
For the most part, states have not adopted different prosecutorial policies 
regarding the admission of non-confronted victim testimony for cases in which 
the victim has died and for cases in which the victim is still alive.  In domestic 
violence cases where the victim has died, the state obviously has a heightened 
responsibility to prosecute the accused.  In these cases, the state can easily imply 
the victim’s willingness to press charges against her spouse given the fact that 
she was murdered and thereby silenced.  However, living victim domestic 
violence cases are different in one key way from cases in which the victim has 
died – living victims still have a voice.  But the prosecutorial tactic applied to 
these wholly different cases is wholly the same: the state presumes the victim’s 
willingness to assist the prosecution because she is viewed as irreversibly 
victimized. 
Feminist thought is concerned with how oppressive power structures affect 
female autonomy and voice.99  One such oppressive power structure is the state, 
 
 98. MYERS, supra note 80, at 849. 
 99. Mallika Kaur Sarkaria, Lessons from Punjab’s “Missing Girls”: Toward a Global Feminist 
Perspective on “Choice” in Abortion, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 905, 906 (2009). 
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traditionally assumed to be patriarchal.100  One way to overcome the state’s 
patriarchal stranglehold is to endorse a normative approach that promotes 
freedom of choice for women in all aspects of their lives.101  The recognition that 
a victim of abuse may still be psychologically able to control the prosecution of 
her accused in accordance with her long-term best interests aligns with this 
normative approach. 
By allowing prosecutors to pursue cases without any input from victims, a 
categorical approach to abusive relationships denies exactly that which many 
feminists suggest is necessary for gender equality: choice and an opportunity to 
voice one’s wishes. As such, a broad application of forfeiture inevitably 
disempowers women in the following way: women will either be forced to testify 
against their spouses indirectly through the admission of non-confronted prior 
accusations, or they will be socially castigated for remaining in an abusive 
relationship that they cannot control.102  This is due to the fact that a broad 
application of forfeiture presumes that the abused has been victimized to the 
point that she is weak, helpless, and unable to make informed, voluntary 
decisions.103  A broad application presumes that the only way to prevent this 
coercion is for the state to intervene and silence the victim’s overt wishes by 
asserting that violence and coercion have overridden individual agency.  In other 
words, for a prosecutor to respect the wishes of a victim not to press charges, the 
victim must instruct the prosecutor to drop the charges with informed consent.  
But the state presumes that a victim of domestic violence can never provide 
informed consent because the consent is believed to have been compelled by fear, 
coercion, or involuntariness. 
There are seemingly two main reasons why prosecutors and policymakers 
assume that domestic violence victims do not have the adequate agency to 
function as atomistic individuals. The first reason is due to dangerous, overbroad 
generalizations that manifest themselves into overt prosecutorial policies. The 
second reason is due to a failure to recognize the various practical and often 
safety-related reasons why a victim might not want to testify against her spouse 
even absent coercion. 
A. Policy Reasons 
One dangerous overgeneralization that manifests itself into a broad 
forfeiture application is the widely held belief that all battered women behave 
within the confines of the battered woman’s syndrome.  The battered woman’s 
syndrome rose to prominence in criminal law cases in the 1970s as an attempted 
 
 100.  R.W. Connell, The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal, 19 THEORY & SOC’Y 
507, 508 (1990) (noting that “[r]ecent theoretical writing contains a remarkable series of sketches of a 
theory of the patriarchal state . . .”). 
 101. Sarkaria, supra note 99, at 936. 
 102. Chiu, supra note 76, at 1225 (noting that battered women usually end up either being denied 
a voice by the system, or being blamed for their abuse). 
 103. See id. Chiu argues that some policies in the criminal justice system “consider battered 
women to be weak and helpless.” Id. She claims that one of these policies is a no-drop system. Id. at 
1230-32. I argue that another such policy is a potential categorical approach to the doctrine of 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. 
Vargas Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2012 10:12 AM 
 PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AFTER GILES 187 
self-defense justification for the murder of an abusive spouse committed by the 
abused spouse.104  The battered woman’s syndrome contains two distinct 
elements: (1) “a cycle of violence“; and (2) “learned helplessness.”105  The “cycle 
of violence” element of the battered woman’s syndrome consists of three phases 
that determine the behavior of the battered spouse.106  First, there is a period of 
initial tension that consists of verbal abuse and minor psychological abuse.107  In 
this period, the woman will try to calm her abuser down or will be abnormally 
kind to the abuser to appease him and to prevent any violent escalation.108 
Second, there is a period of battering where women are subjected to the most 
dangerous period of physical abuse.109  A woman’s behavior during this period 
is solely concerned with protecting herself from further violence, recognizing 
that any resistance will only make the violence worse.110  The third phase, known 
as the “honeymoon phase,”111 involves a period of reconciliation whereupon the 
batterer apologizes for his behavior and claims that he will never employ such 
violence again.112  Here, the woman remains in the relationship believing that her 
spouse has changed his violent ways or hopeful that she can be a catalyst for 
future change.113  Prosecutors likely would allege that battered women are in this 
final phase when the state decides to intervene since the domestic violence 
incident in question would have only recently occurred. 
But it is considerably overbroad and dangerous to assume that all battered 
women act within the confines of the battered woman’s syndrome, especially if 
this means that the victims of abuse are going to be deprived of their voice and 
their ability to choose what is in their best interests.  Many academics 
documenting battered women have noted that victims of domestic abuse do not 
consider themselves to be within the confines of the battered woman’s syndrome 
because they do not consider themselves to be “exclusively victimized.”114  There 
should indeed be some legitimate concern that a victim might be in denial when 
refusing to testify against her spouse.  However, a proper solution to this concern 
should not consist of a jurisprudential doctrine that inhibits both her autonomy 
and her voice by applying a blanket assertion of coercion that characterizes the 
abused spouse as irreversibly “victimized” simply because she has been abused 
in the past.  Rather, there should be an analogous concern that an overemphasis 
 
 104. Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
141, 143 (1995) (“Since its inception in the late 1970s, the battered woman syndrome has benefited 
victims of domestic violence–-most prominently, those women who are on trial for killing their 
batterers and who plead self-defense.”). 
 105. Id. at 165. 
 106. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55 (1979). 
 107. Id. at 56. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 59. 
 110. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY 
RESPONDS 44 (1989). 
 111. Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and 
the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L. J. 1253, 1259 (1987). 
 112. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 110, at 44–45. 
 113. Id. at 45. 
 114. Chiu, supra note 76, at 1247–48. 
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on victimization could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by “discouraging people 
who are victimized from developing their own strengths or working to resist the 
limitations they encounter.”115  This is especially true if there are practical 
reasons why it might not be in the abused spouse’s immediate best interest to 
testify against her spouse even absent coercion. 
B. Practical Concerns 
There is a misinformed belief that victims of domestic violence have no 
justifiable reason for making themselves unavailable at trial outside of the fear of 
violent reprisal by their abusive spouse.  In fact, there are legitimate, informed 
reasons why a victim of domestic violence might refuse to testify and might 
make herself unavailable at trial for the sake of her immediate best interest.  First, 
when a battered woman calls for emergency assistance, it cannot be 
automatically concluded that she wants the police to get involved. Often, those 
calling for help solely desire medical assistance.116  Second, victims of domestic 
violence might not want to testify against their spouses because of economically-
motivated concerns.  Poor women are significantly more likely than more 
affluent women to experience domestic violence.  Women whose household 
adjusted gross income (AGI) is less than $7,500 per year are over four times more 
likely to be abused than their more affluent counterparts with household AGIs 
over $75,000 per year.117  Abused women also might not want to participate in 
any legal proceedings against their spouses for fear that their children will be 
placed in protective custody because they permitted an abusive relationship to 
occur.118  Third, unique circumstances may preclude any desire for state 
intervention.119  For example, undocumented immigrants might not want law 
enforcement involvement for fear of deportation resulting from the 
government’s investigation into the domestic dispute.120 
A victim of domestic abuse might also refuse to participate in legal 
proceedings against her spouse because of a desire to preserve her marriage, 
often for religious reasons.  Various critics are skeptical about the authenticity of 
the preservation of marriage justification for many compelling reasons.121  
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the preservation of marriage is 
 
 115. Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1429 (1993). Minow warns that 
continuing to label the victim as “victimized” can “suppress the strengths and capacities of people 
who are victims. Victim talk can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality.” Id.  
 116. See Chiu, supra note 76, at 1230. 
 117. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE BY INMATES: 
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 14 
(1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. 
 118. See, e.g., Karen Houppert, Victimizing the Victims, THE VILLAGE VOICE, June 15, 1999, at 42, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/9923/houppert.php (noting that battered women 
are being charged with “failure to protect” and risk losing custody of their children for allowing them 
to be exposed to domestic violence). 
 119. Deidre Ewing, Note, Prosecuting Batterers in the Wake of Davis and Hammon, 35 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 91, 96 (2007). 
 120.  Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered Rationale, 14 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 21–24 (1999). 
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a legitimate enough interest to allow a testifying spouse to assert a privilege 
which would exclude potentially probative evidence at trial.122  It is unclear then 
why the preservation of marriage would not be a legitimate enough interest for 
an abused spouse to voluntarily make herself unavailable at trial as well. 
A categorical application of the forfeiture doctrine presents a very similar 
threat to the institution of marriage as would the complete eradication of the 
adverse testimony privilege.123  By not allowing the victim to decide whether she 
should indirectly testify against her spouse without any further inquiry into the 
extent of the abuse and the specific intent of the defendant, we limit her 
autonomy and her voice.  Rather than taking such a broad approach, the 
forfeiture doctrine should mirror the evolution of the adverse testimony 
privilege, laid out in the next section, to one that involves at least some measure 
of autonomy, while recognizing the large possibility of spousal coercion.  
Allowing a similar measure of autonomy in the forfeiture doctrine as that found 
in the adverse testimony privilege will at the very least promote legal 
consistency and a mutual recognition of the importance of a testifying spouse’s 
right to shape her own destiny. 
IV. THE ADVERSE TESTIMONY PRIVILEGE AND SPOUSAL AUTONOMY 
There are currently two evidentiary privileges related to marriage: the 
confidential communications privilege and the adverse testimony privilege.  The 
former protects private marital communications from being divulged in court, 
while the latter protects spouses from being compelled to incriminate one 
another.124  The confidential communications privilege is similar to the attorney-
client privilege in that it only protects against the disclosure of communication 
made in confidence during the course of marriage.  The adverse testimony 
privilege, on the other hand, protects all sorts of incriminating disclosures, 
whether pertaining to confidential communications or not, made before or 
during the course of a lawful marriage. 
The adverse testimony privilege has a long common law history.  What is 
now a privilege was once a general prohibition on one’s ability to testify against 
his or her spouse.125  There were various justifications for this per se prohibition.  
First, medieval canons of jurisprudence focused on the notion of a unity in 
marriage, therefore allowing the accused spouse to prohibit the testifying spouse 
from taking the stand against him because it was akin to self-incrimination.126  In 
 
 122. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
 123. I admit that there might be very compelling reasons to actually do away with the marital 
privilege completely but that is not the crux of my argument. My only concern is that if Supreme 
Court jurisprudence recognizes that the desire to preserve one’s marriage is a compelling justification 
important enough to protect with a common law evidentiary privilege, then there should be some 
consistency by allowing a similar rationale to apply to the forfeiture doctrine. For a very compelling 
argument as to why complete eradication of the adverse testimonial privilege might make for good 
policy, see generally Frost, supra note 121. 
 124. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44–46. 
 125. Frost, supra note 121, at 8. 
 126. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (noting that, in medieval jurisprudence, the husband and wife 
were considered one). 
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1933, this blanket rule of spousal disqualification was abolished.127  Later, 
proponents of the adverse testimony privilege began to focus on the sanctity of 
marriage and concluded that the incrimination of one spouse by another would 
inevitably destroy the marital union.128  Thus, what had been an automatic 
disqualification evolved into a spousal privilege.  But there still remained some 
discrepancy as to who retained the privilege – the defendant or the testifying 
spouse. 
In United States v. Trammel, the Supreme Court clarified that the testifying 
spouse retains the adverse testimony privilege.129  In other words, the testifying 
spouse has the opportunity to decide whether or not she wants to testify against 
her spouse.  The Court’s decision to mitigate such a broad-sweeping privilege 
was motivated by three core concerns.  First, there was a clear concern about the 
heightened possibility of injustice caused by the exclusion of probative evidence 
that would result if the defendant spouse held the privilege.130  Second, the 
allegedly important interests related to the sanctity of marriage that had 
previously required such a broad-sweeping marital privilege were no longer 
compelling.  The Court suggested that the preservation of marriage remains a 
strong justification for the existence of a spousal privilege, but reasoned that if 
the testifying spouse is willing to testify against the defendant spouse then there 
is little marriage worth saving.131  Finally, the Court noted that there should be 
some semblance of judicial recognition of female autonomy: “Nowhere in the 
common-law world – indeed in any modern society – is a woman regarded as 
chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity 
associated with recognition as a whole human being.”132 
In Trammel, the Supreme Court was noticeably cynical about the need for an 
adverse testimony privilege, given the existence of the marital communications 
privilege.  However, the fact that the Court did not attenuate the privilege at all 
is quite suggestive of important underlying considerations.  In not striking down 
the adverse testimony privilege, the Court recognized that the decision to 
preserve one’s marriage justifies the exclusion of potentially probative evidence.  
Further, the Court maintained that the testifying spouse should be allowed to 
choose for herself whether she will risk the potential dissolution of her marriage 
by testifying against her spouse.  If this is the case for an evidentiary privilege, it 
is unclear why the same rationale should not also extend to the forfeiture 
doctrine.  A categorical approach to forfeiture undermines the very autonomy 
concerns deemed compelling in Trammel, while dealing with evidence of 
similarly probative force.  If that is the case, then it is quite clear that another 
approach should be applied instead to obtain consistency in the law of evidence. 
 
 127. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1933). 
 128. See id. at 381 (“It has been said that to admit such testimony is against public policy because 
it would endanger the harmony and confidences of marital relations . . . .”). 
 129. 445 U.S. at 53. 
 130. Id. at 51–52. 
 131. Id. at 52. 
 132. Id. 
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V. A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO FORFEITURE IN LIVING VICTIM CASES 
The Supreme Court’s formulation of the forfeiture doctrine in Giles provides 
an approach that is already sufficiently clear for trial courts to apply and allows 
for some consideration of victim autonomy without needing to resort to any 
categorical alternatives.  Under Giles, a defendant has forfeited his right to 
confrontation when he has procured the witness’s unavailability with the specific 
intent to prevent the witness from testifying.133  This approach is what I label a 
“contextual approach” or an “intent-based approach,” as opposed to a 
“categorical approach.” 
A contextual approach to forfeiture in cases of domestic violence is 
straightforward: in order to determine whether the defendant has forfeited his 
right to confrontation by his own wrongdoing, the lower court must review the 
contextual details of the abusive relationship, along with several other factors, to 
determine whether there is enough evidence to infer the defendant’s specific 
intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.134 
In contrast, a categorical approach applies a certain exception to the general 
rule for a specific category of cases.135  In the present context, the category would 
be defined as cases of domestic violence where the victim and the defendant are 
involved in a “classic abusive relationship.”136  Under a categorical approach, a 
lower court factual finding of a “classic abusive relationship” would 
automatically presume forfeiture.137 
Although very persuasive arguments exist, there is no immediate reason to 
deviate from a contextual approach to a categorical approach simply because the 
crime involves domestic violence.  Specific intent matters just as much in the 
domestic violence context as it does in criminal law generally.  The Giles majority 
rightfully focuses on the specific intent of the defendant in its analysis of the 
forfeiture doctrine because only where such specific intent is present are victims 
actually being coerced into not testifying.  As noted in Giles, the forfeiture 
doctrine has always been concerned with this kind of witness tampering and 
coercion.138  If the victim of domestic abuse has in any way been coerced, such 
coercion will become manifestly evident, or at least circumstantially evident, 
after an inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind, as would be the case with any 
other crime.  Such a circumstantial inquiry will undoubtedly involve an in-depth 
examination into the nature of the abusive relationship.  Should such an 
examination reveal a strong likelihood of coercion to prevent spousal testimony, 
then forfeiture should be presumed. Absent such a finding, forfeiture should be 
 
 133. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008). 
 134. See, e.g., id. at 367–68. 
 135. For a recent application of a categorical approach by the Supreme Court, see Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), where the Court applied a categorical approach to juvenile sentencing 
by not permitting a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without some meaningful 
opportunity to release. The approach is considered “categorical” because it implicates a specific type 
of sentence (life in prison) to a specific class of offenders (juveniles). 
 136. See, e.g., Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 137. It is unclear whether this presumption is rebuttable. Given that Justice Souter states that such 
a finding is per se forfeiture, I assume that it is not. 
 138. Giles, 554 U.S. at 374. 
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avoided.  Only in the former case, where a defendant has the requisite specific 
intent to prevent his spouse from testifying, does fundamental fairness require 
an override of the victim’s autonomy and voice regarding whether to offer 
incriminating evidence against her spouse or not. 
There is no need to drastically overhaul Giles’s formulation, because a 
contextual approach is neither at odds with Justice Scalia’s formulation, nor is it 
completely at odds with Justice Souter’s approach.  A contextual approach tries 
to reconcile both views by recognizing that domestic violence can certainly be 
coercive but that the victim should still be able to retain some degree of 
autonomy in shaping her own destiny. 
For the sake of clarity, it might be best to arrange abusive relationships 
along a spectrum from most coercive to least coercive.  At the most coercive end 
of the spectrum are cases in which there is a dead victim linked to very probative 
evidence of systematic abuse and various recantations of prior allegations of 
abuse.  The presumption of forfeiture is the strongest in these cases because the 
victim has already been denied her voice and because there is strong direct or 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that the defendant has engaged in severely 
coercive behavior.  This evidence should manifest itself into a strong 
presumption that the defendant had the requisite intent to prevent the victim 
from testifying.  As a result, this situation is one more likely to warrant a Souter-
like presumption of forfeiture.139 
Conversely, on the least coercive end of the spectrum are cases in which 
there is a live recanting victim with little evidence of continuous systematic 
abuse.  This situation is more likely to warrant a Scalia-like approach, where 
what little evidence of abuse there is becomes one of many factors to consider in 
determining the defendant’s specific intent.  However, as noted in Giles, the 
determinative factor as to whether to apply the doctrine of forfeiture is always 
whether the defendant had the requisite specific intent to prevent the victim 
from testifying.140  Any presumption otherwise must be rebuttable in order for the 
defendant’s mens rea to remain as the core concern of the forfeiture inquiry. 
Obviously, the determination of specific intent becomes much more 
muddled in the middle of the spectrum.  These complex forfeiture cases, with 
live recanting victims in which there is probative evidence of abuse, are the cases 
which would be most severely affected by a categorical approach in terms of 
overriding the victim’s explicit wishes.  In these cases, due to a concern for victim 
autonomy, equitable determination of forfeiture should again remain squarely 
focused on the specific intent of the defendant.  The defendant has the 
confrontation privilege under the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, only the 
defendant’s intended actions to forfeit this privilege should eradicate his right to 
confrontation. 
Scalia’s approach is valuable in these intermediate cases, as his view 
recognizes that continuous accusations of abuse, or threats of abuse, suggest that 
 
 139. Although notably not a per se presumption under my formulation. 
 140. Giles, 554 U.S. at 361 (“The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that 
unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to 
prevent a witness from testifying.”) (emphasis added). 
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the defendant intended to coerce the victim from testifying.141  Given the 
incredible statistics related to victim recantation,142 such coercive tendencies 
cannot be denied.  For Scalia, evidence of abuse or threats of abuse is one of 
several factors used in determining whether the defendant had the requisite 
specific intent.143  But Scalia’s approach does not go far enough. 
Scalia admits that “[a]cts of domestic violence often are intended to 
dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help” and, therefore, can be 
suggestive of conduct designed to prevent victim testimony.144  Although Scalia 
clearly recognizes that abusive relationships can be coercive and can isolate the 
victim, he does not seem to recognize the fact that this abuse or coercion should 
be the most important factor in determining whether the defendant had the 
requisite specific intent, especially given the lack of otherwise probative evidence 
in these cases.  Where the degree of violence is severe and where there are 
continuous accusations of domestic violence to law enforcement met with violent 
spousal retribution, a very strong, but rebuttable, presumption should be 
applied.  This approach is closer to Souter’s suggested approach in Giles. 
Making evidence of abuse and threats of abuse the two most important 
factors in determining the defendant’s specific intent strikes a suitable 
compromise for those concerned with autonomy and for those justifiably 
concerned with possible witness intimidation by domestic abusers.  And, since 
the defendant’s specific intent can be so hard to prove, especially in the middle of 
the spectrum cases, this compromise appeases any fear that Crawford will give 
offenders a greater incentive to threaten, coerce, or kill their victims as a means 
of ensuring dismissal.145  Meanwhile, this sliding scale analysis ensures that 
female autonomy remains intact and that fundamental constitutional protections 
will not be further eroded. 
But this does not mean that evidence of abuse or threats of abuse should be 
the sole determinative factor in deciphering the defendant’s specific intent either. 
Such a position would be tantamount to Souter’s approach in Giles, which, unlike 
Scalia’s approach, is overinclusive.  In addition to evidence of abuse, a trial court 
judge might also want to consider the gravity, longevity, and type of abuse, as 
well as the extent to which the abuse seems coercive or intended to shield the 
victim from obtaining any outside assistance.  Other factors to consider may 
include: (1) whether there is any recanted testimony; (2) the reasons given by the 
victim for recanting her testimony; (3) the reasons given by the victim in 
attempting to procure state involvement in the first place; and (4) potential safety 
concerns in allowing the victim to remain in the abusive relationship.  In 
weighing these various factors, trial courts will be able to recognize the 
inherently coercive element of intimate partner violence without undermining 
the victim’s choice and the defendant’s constitutional protections. 
Unless such additional factors are considered, Souter’s broad-sweeping 
 
 141. Id. at 377. 
 142. See supra Section III. 
 143. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
 144. Id. 
 145.  Brief for California Partnership to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 34–35, Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859396. 
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approach risks considerably eroding the autonomy and voice of a recanting 
victim in deciding whether or not she wants to testify against her spouse.  
Souter’s approach also overlooks the various policy and practical reasons why 
abused women might want to remain in a potentially abusive relationship in the 
short term.146  Moreover, a categorical formulation presupposes that the state is 
acting in the best interest of the victim in requiring immediate intervention even 
though the period of criminal prosecution is the period most likely to culminate 
in the victim’s death or in serious injury. 
It should be noted that state intervention can and should still play a 
fundamental role in these intermediate cases where the evidence of continuous 
abuse is not substantial enough to presume forfeiture.  However, such state 
intervention is better directed at a legislative forum than a judicial one.  Other 
salient methods exist that can be used to obtain probative evidence that do not 
threaten the autonomy or voice of domestic abuse victims by allowing for higher 
rates of voluntary compliance.  For example, in lieu of the forced introduction of 
recanted statements, the legislature could pool state resources into counseling, 
witness protection, and other methods of safety planning in order to secure 
voluntary victim assistance.147  Some jurisdictions have already attempted to 
obtain cooperation in this way and have had considerable success.  For example, 
the Family Justice Center, a community group that houses 25 domestic violence 
service agencies, was recently established in San Diego to combat domestic 
violence and foster cooperation between public and private entities that provide 
services to victims of domestic violence.148  This agency was highly successful in 
obtaining voluntary victim cooperation with both prosecutors and law 
enforcement.149  After the agency’s first three years of existence, the San Diego 
District Attorney’s Office reported that nearly seventy percent of victims agreed 
to testify at trial compared to having nearly seventy percent of victims refuse to 
do so a few years prior.150 Such optimistic results suggest that female autonomy 
and spousal safety may be better preserved in tandem through legislative action 
than through a judicially crafted remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note is concerned with the application of the forfeiture doctrine in 
cases of domestic violence and the effect it can have on a victim’s autonomy, 
voice, and inevitably on gender disparity generally.  In order to ensure that 
female autonomy and gender equality is not further destabilized, the specific 
intent of the defendant should remain the guiding marker for the application of 
the forfeiture doctrine in cases of domestic violence as in criminal law generally.  
Only in cases where the defendant shows clear intent to prevent the victim from 
testifying based upon significant direct or circumstantial evidence is the victim 
 
 146. See supra Section III. 
 147. See Ewing, supra note 119, at 97–99 (noting several legislative assistance programs for victims 
of domestic violence). 
 148. See CASEY GWINN & GAEL STRACK, HOPE FOR HURTING FAMILIES: CREATING FAMILY JUSTICE 
CENTERS ACROSS AMERICA 55–59 (2006). 
 149. Id. at 108–09. 
 150. Id. at 109. 
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actually being coerced into not testifying.  It is only these cases that merit an 
override of the victim’s wishes and the defendant’s constitutional protections. 
This is especially true if victims have legitimate reasons to not testify against 
their spouses that reasonably align with their immediate best interests. 
In order to infer the defendant’s specific intent, a judge should certainly 
consider the contextual details of the abusive relationship, as abusive 
relationships are inherently coercive.  But this consideration alone should not be 
per se determinative.  Depriving a victim of her autonomy could lead to severe 
physical, social and economic ramifications.  Moreover, such deprivation could 
also threaten female gender equality by not allowing women to decide what is in 
their best interests as individuals and as a class.  The threat of coercion in 
domestic violence relationships is real, but any forced state intervention may be 
better directed at legislative action rather than an irrebuttable judicial 
presumption. 
 
